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Abstract:
Many experts, policymakers, and journalists had been enthusiastically advising Argentina to 
abandon the currency board arrangement that had been In place since 1991, on the grounds that 
it was choking Its economy. They were disappointed when Argentina’s attempt to devalue “just a 
little” ended up in a collapse of its currency and real GDP. We argue that the reason why the de­
valuation “drug” didn’t cure Argentina is because the doctors who recommended it overlooked 
that the perfect information conditions required for the medication to work properly were not met 
by that country. We propose an alternative “diagnosis,” according to which the attempt to de­
value "just a little” ends up in higher depreciation and inflation rates than originally intended. This 
prediction, consistent with the evidence for Argentina, suggests that non-state contingent 
(“rigid” ,) monetary regimes, such as a currency board or outright dollarization, might dominate in 
a welfare sense, by virtue of a transparency-inducing feature, state-contingent (“flexible” ) policies 
in countries like Argentina, where economic agents are unable to satisfactorily monitor the poli­
cymakers’ actions, as well as the underlying decision process.
Key Words: Argentina, devaluation, currency boards, optimal monetary policy, time 
inconsistency.
INTRODUCTION
It is not perhaps by chance that someone born in Argentina like me has be­
ing honored with an invitation to share his thoughts in Venezuelan soil about 
monetary policy options in Latin America: both my native country and the one I 
have the pleasure to visit for this event have a lot in common: they are, in paper, 
rich countries.
* This paper was prepared for the International Seminar "Monetary Options for South 
America in the Light of the Globalization and Integration Processes,” organized by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (IIES) and the Master in Economic Theory and 
Policy of the Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV), in collaboration with the Central 
Bank of Venezuela and the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), held in Caracas, 
Venezuela, on November 27-29, 2002. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Prof. 
Sary Levy Carciente and Prof. Luis Mata Mollejas for the opportunity to share his thoughts 
with the participants in the Seminar, making clear, however, that the views expressed 
herein are exclusively his and do not reflect necessarily the position of the Federal Reser­
ve Bank of Dallas or of the Federal Reserve System.
12 Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura
Venezuela, the fifth oil exporter in the world, should have the same living 
standards as Saudi Arabia. Yet, not only is the income of its average citizen less 
than half that of its luckier Saudi counterpart, but it is also currently deteriorating 
to levels not seen in many decades.
Likewise, Argentina, with its fertile Pampas and sufficient oil and gas to sup­
ply cheap energy to its food industry, was supposed to prosper selling abundant 
calories and proteins to the world. Yet, its population is plagued with lethal infant 
malnutrition, increasingly looking to outside observers as the unfortunate crew of 
the Kursk, trapped at the bottom of deep sea, desperately gasping for air while 
political bickering and mutinies unwisely exhaust the limited supply of oxygen 
(international reserves, that is) that keeps their hopes breathing.
The gap between the prosperity that Argentina could accomplish and its cur­
rent sad state of affairs is dramatically captured in Exhibit A. I bet a sim ilar p ic­
ture would emerge for Venezuela. How come two richly endowed countries 
manage to be so poor relatively to their potential?
The maintained hypothesis in these comments is that the main responsible 
for that tragic gap is not the particular monetary arrangement in place in each of 
those countries, but their bad and reprehensible habit of reneging on past prom ­
ises, that is, their propensity to fall too often in what is known in the literature as 
the time inconsistency temptation. As demonstrated in the seminal article by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977,) the governments o f all countries are subject to that 
temptation. But for reasons not yet fully understood-and which these comments 
represent an attempt to start thinking about-Argentina, Venezuela, and many 
other Latin American countries have succumbed to that temptation far more fre­
quently and virulently than other regions of the world, with devastating conse­
quences for their standards of living.
For the sake of intellectual honesty, let me point out that many respected 
scholars will dispute this diagnosis on the grounds that the “time inconsistency” 
problem is not important when considering the convenience of devaluations. 
Heavy weights like Paul Krugman belong to that group. Yet, I’ll dare to challenge 
those views by showing, somewhat paradoxically, why the devaluation advice 
they offered to Argentina was not completely unreasonable and, in fact, quite 
sound under a different set of conditions than those that were prevailing in that 
country when it de facto abandoned its currency board some time in 2001.
A prelim inary piece of evidence in support of the time inconsistency disease 
hypothesis is that the predictions that a devaluation would get started in Argen­
tina a virtuous circle of prosperity failed to materialize. The economic havoc that 
followed the devaluation instead is entirely in line with the predictions inspired by
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the time inconsistency literature. The main purpose of these comments will be 
precisely to present to the consideration of the reader a novel interpretation of 
the key factors behind those gloomy predictions. The hope is that such under­
standing will in the future induce countries burdened with heavy debts and ane­
mic growth to request a second opinion before they accept the devaluation 
prescription from doctors who don't take seriously the potentially lethal time in­
consistency side effects of the drug.
I - THE TIME INCONSISTENCY PROBLEM IN ARGENTINA
The origins of Argentina’s economic growth travails in the last four years or 
so are often traced to the adoption o f its quasi-currency board arrangement in 
1991. In the opinion of many experts, echoed in policy forums and the press, the 
problem with that system is that it condemned Argentina’s currency, the peso, to 
persistent periods of “overvaluation.” Unable to compete in the world markets, its 
economy would, sooner or later, grind to a halt. According to this popular inter­
pretation, all Argentines had to do to live happily ever after was to throw away 
their archaic currency board system. Paul Krugman eloquently captured this view 
in his New York Times editorial of January 1, 2002:
“ I could explain at length the causes of Argentina's slump: it had more to do 
with monetary policy than with free markets.... I.M.F. staffers have known for 
months, perhaps years, that the one-peso-one-dollar policy could not be sustained. 
And the I.M.F. could have offered Argentina guidance on how to escape from its 
monetary trap, as well as political cover for Argentina's leaders as they did what had 
to be done.”
Krugm an’s was certainly not the only call to Argentine government officials to 
be “brave and do what needed to be done.” Many others scholars, policymakers, 
and journalists shared the same view1. It is only fair, however, to point out that 
other giants in the profession, albeit rather quiet, like Tom Sargent and Neil W al­
lace, would cough at the notion that the sustainability or unsustainability of a 
particular exchange rate regime can be confidently established w ithout any refer­
ence whatsoever to the fiscal policy simultaneously in place2.
1 See also Bordo and Chang (2001), Financial Times (2001), Lunhow and Druckerman 
(2001), and Fernandez and Portes (2002).
2 It is unfortunate that so many members of the profession overlook too often their cele­
brated “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” result (Sargent and Wallace, 1987) which con­
vincingly demonstrated that fiscal and monetary policies are inextricably linked through the 
government budget constraint, and that it is impossible therefore to make statements
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In any case, Argentina did what the doctors had ordered and indeed, left the 
recession behind... to get full speed into an economic depression that was still 
unfolding at the time of this writing, almost a year after the devaluation. The con­
trasts between the results of the devaluation “drug” and the ones that were ad­
vertised are so stark that the profession bears the serious responsibility of 
explaining what went wrong with the medication, lest it wants to induce the gen­
eral public to believe that uncertified quacks can do much better at curing eco­
nomic growth ailments.
If the readers are tempted to think that the very different ending that A rgen­
tines are experiencing after repudiating its currency board has forced many ex­
perts to revise their theories and, accordingly, their policy prescriptions, they are 
naively wrong. The happy ending predictions were carefully crafted to make them 
oblivious to evidence: “of course the devaluation in Argentina turned sour... You 
see, they should have done it earlier... By the time they actually did what the 
doctors had ordered, the disease was too spread to fight it successfully. And 
besides... they didn’t follow the treatment guidelines with the precision required 
to guarantee its success.”
Never mind, either, that Venezuela is in the same kind of trouble, even it ne­
ver had a currency board and it has been consistently devaluing its currency. 
Don’t you dare to mention Uruguay. True, that country is mired in a depression 
as severe as Argentina’s, and true, that is the case even if Uruguay, like Vene­
zuela, has been consistently devaluing its currency as well, and way before A r­
gentina did (see Exhibit B.) But you can’t ask a flexible exchange rate to protect 
you against a fire next door, can you?3
There is no point in arguing with theories that cannot be falsified because, li­
ke the chameleon, change colors with the surroundings to avoid detection. Nor it 
is my interest, which is to present to the consideration of the readers scientific 
arguments about the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for predicting 
the effects of devaluations, rather than engaging in useless and endless polem ­
ics with die-hard dogmatics.
It is for that reason that I have to be thankful to Paul Krugman as a source of 
inspiration in another one of his articles on Argentina, this time an Op-Ed editorial 
that appeared in the New York Times issue of November 7, 2001. Not for his
a b o u t on e  w ith o u t im p lic itly  o r e xp lic itly  m ak ing  a t the  sam e tim e  a ssu m p tio n s  o r s ta te ­
m en ts  a b o u t th e  o ther.
3 1 c a n ’t im a g ine  th a t a fte r all th e se  w a rn in g s  a b o u t an n oy ing  q u e s tion s  a re a d e r w ill risk to 
ask w h a t a fle x ib le  e x ch a n g e  ra te  reg im e  is then  good  for.
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arguments in favor of a devaluation, which I had heard before with great interest 
and concern, but for suggesting a question that brings to the forefront the issue 
of the time inconsistency problem.
Insightful as usual, Professor Krugman pointed out there:
“I've written before about an apparent double standard for economic policy in 
the third world, but this is truly bizarre. Advanced countries often devalue their cur­
rencies — but Argentina is being told that it can’t. On the other hand, advanced 
countries never default on their debt — but Argentina is being told that it must.”
Indeed, several distinguished members of the profession and prominent gov­
ernment officials o f the G7 countries, as well as o f the IMF, insisted all along 
2001 that Argentina’s way out of its pile of debt (accumulated in part with the 
blessing of the IMF) was an “orderly” default4. The optim istic view was indeed 
puzzling from the perspective of a prolific literature on the subject suggesting that 
“ain’t such a thing”5. No one less than the Chief Economist of the IMF, author as 
he is of articles on the topic published in top academic journals in the profession, 
has recently asserted that on the issue of sovereign debt restructuring “there has 
been a moving consensus on what constitutes the underlying problem, but not on 
how to fix it.” (Rogoff and Zettelmeyer, 2002.) The conspicuous omission of the 
potentially lethal side-effects of “orderly” defaults in proposals extolling their vir­
tues is all the more serious when one considers that, just out of common sense, 
the man in the street would probably be inclined to regard the default recomm en­
dation as wise as inciting a lover to cheat on the expectations of a “friendly” split- 
up from the regular partner6.
Anyway, hardly anything could offer more conclusive proof of the relevance 
of the time inconsistency problem than sovereign debt defaults. They clearly 
identify a practical instance in which a government, committed to make payments 
according to certain schedule documented in the non-contingent debt instru­
ments issued to that effect, reneges to do so when the time of honoring the
4 See, for example, Lerrick and Meltzer (2001), and Calomiris (2001).
5 See, for example, Atkeson (1991).
6 A “default and prosper” approach doesn’t certainly sound like the one ambitious and 
smart entrepreneurs would take to. run their businesses. Paul Krugman’s second sentence 
in his comments just quoted confirms that former Argentine Minister of Finance, Domingo 
Cavallo, was right to chastise the unsolicited advice as an attempt to transform Argentina 
into a “guinea pig” on which to test “new theories” of default. Unfortunately, the laboratory 
experiment has ended up in a monster that not even the IMF knows how to tame or 
“terminate” .
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commitment comes. It is surprising then that this overwhelming evidence on the 
severity of the time inconsistency problem is summarily dismissed as irrelevant 
when it comes to discussions about the most appropriate monetary policy or 
exchange rate regime for countries like Argentina.
The disregard for the time inconsistency problem is also present in the first 
sentence of Krugman’s comments quoted immediately above, pointing out the 
apparent double standard of letting developed countries float their currencies and 
at the same time condemning Argentina for trying to do the same. It is important 
to alert the readers that in order to deliver his message more strongly, in that first 
sentence Krugman is appealing to the standard literary trick of setting up a “straw 
man” that distorts a little bit the facts in his favor.
The "right-wing think tanks” that, in Krugman’s words, supported Argentina ’s 
currency board arrangement never supported, at the same time, a flexible ex­
change rate regime for developed countries. In fact, I suspect that they would 
subscribe as enthusiastically the return of the whole world to the gold standard. 
No double standard there. Perhaps lack of rigor (although many on the opposite 
side of the argument could be accused- of the same,) but no lack of coherence 
and, certainly, no disregard for the time inconsistency problem.
No double standard on the part of the IMF either: by the beginning of 2001 
that institution, like a good disciple, had finally embraced Krugman’s teaching 
throughout his distinguished career that flexible exchange rates are superior to 
fixed ones for every country. The IMF was then doing nothing but following 
Krugm an’s lead when it started to urge Argentina to abandon its “rigid” currency 
board regime in 2001, with the implicit assumption that the time inconsistency 
problem was not severe enough to change the prescription. Much to his chagrin, 
on the count of prescribing a devaluation drug with devastating economic health 
effects for Argentina, Krugman will be handed out the same verdict as the IMF he 
declared guilty as charged on the misguided “orderly” default advice count7.
Before the jury proceeds with its deliberations, however, the judge must in­
struct them that, despite the bold accusations, strictly speaking neither Krugman 
nor the IMF recommended a devaluation for Argentina. They simply favored the
7 In c id e n ta lly , K ru g m a n ’s iron ic  a sse ssm e n t o f o rd e rly  d e fa u lt re co m m e n d a tio n s  is itse lf 
iron ic , b e ca use  h is sug g es tio n , s im ila r to  one  trum p e ted  by fo rm e r ch a m p io n  o f d o lla r iz a ­
tion  R ica rdo  H au sm a n n , th a t A rg e n tina  shou ld  c o m p u ls ive ly  sw ap  asse ts  d e n o m in a te d  in 
do lla rs  fo r a sse ts  d e n om in a te d  in a deva lu ed  loca l cu rre n cy  w as indeed  a co n c re te  w a y  to 
im p le m e n t an “o rd e r ly ” d e fa u lt... in a n tic ip a tion  o f w h ich  d e p os ito rs  took  th e ir sa v in g s  ou t 
o f th e  b a n ks  as fa s t as they cou ld , th e re b y  p re c ip ita tin g , indeed , a ch a o tic  de fau lt.
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adoption of more flexible monetary policies, the result of which could be som e­
times, though not always, devaluations. But, and this is crucial for a fair trial, if 
the immediate outcome turned out to be indeed a devaluation, then it would 
surely be followed later by a corresponding appreciation.
At least that is what Exhibit C suggests it should have been expected from 
the “flexible" monetary policy prescription that the IMF and Krugman wrote for 
Argentina. The chart presents a time series of the nominal exchange rate be­
tween the now demised Deutsche Mark and the US dollar. Underlying that ex­
change rate path is a monetary policy certainly much more flexible than the one 
Argentina started implementing in April 1, 1991 and officially abandoned in Janu­
ary 6, 2002. As the chart makes clear, the flexible monetary policy did not induce 
a permanent devaluation of the Deutsche Mark. True, as a result of that flexible 
policy, the Mark suffered a devaluation in the first half of the 1980s. However, it 
recovered steadily afterwards. Holders of assets denominated in Marks could not 
have been happier with a flexible monetary policy that isolated their economy 
from shocks that it could not handle on its own8, and that at the same time pre­
served, ups and downs aside, the long term real value of their savings.
The fact that the flexible monetary prescription produced such promising re­
sults in Germany should exonerate Krugman and the IMF for prescribing the 
same drug for Argentina with far less favorable, and in fact, almost lethal, results. 
After all, and contrary to the “orderly” default recommendation, the prescription 
had solid and widely accepted theoretical foundations on the well-established 
result that under perfect information, state-contingent policy rules dominate, in a 
welfare sense, non-state-contingent rules such as a currency board, and its even 
more extreme version, dollarization.
As w e ’ll see later, there is more to the perfect information caveat than advo­
cates of flexible monetary policies typically recognize, but for the time being, 
Exhibit C brings us back to the issue brought up by Krugman in the first sentence 
of his comments above: Does it make any sense that “advanced countries often 
devalue their currencies —  but Argentina is being told that it can't?” .
From the foregoing discussion about the optimality of state-contingent rules, 
the reader might jump to the conclusion, as Krugman apparently did, that the 
answer to that question is clearly “no.” However, w e ’ll argue below that when all 
the relevant factors, including the time inconsistency temptation, are properly 
taken into account, the answer is a resounding “yes,” and therefore, that the
8 Presumably due to the presence of market imperfection, such as incomplete markets or 
nominal rigidities.
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“ right-wing think tanks” stance against devaluations that Krugman dismissed 
might indeed be right, although perhaps for the wrong reasons.
In fact, if I dare to encourage the readers not to skip the somewhat more 
technical section that follows is because they might discover in it that there might 
be more than just dogma behind predictions that look a lot like the ones that 
Krugman has identified as coming from “right-wing think tanks.” The opposite 
might be closer to the truth, because a theme that allegedly fascinates “ left w ing” 
circles, the overwhelm ing presence of imperfect information problems in the 
economy, plays a prominent role in the implication, almost naturally emerging 
from the analysis of “flexible” monetary policies offered below, that a devaluation 
may create more problems than it solves.
In any case, the purpose of the fairly heavy technical arguments in the sec­
tion that follows is not to indict any expert or institution for a particular policy rec­
ommendation, but rather to present to the consideration of the readers an 
“artificial” or “model” economy, that is, an abstract representation of how real 
economies work, in which the presence of the time inconsistency virus can make 
the devaluation medicine worse than the disease. As we’ll argue later, the evi­
dence seems to validate the empirical relevance of this “toy economy” better than 
the implicit or explicit models behind the predictions that a devaluation could not 
bring but good things to an ailing Argentine economy.
II.- A TOY ECONOMY IN WHICH THE DEVALUATION CURE IS WORSE THAN THE DISEASE
As indicated above, in this section we put together the elements of a sort of 
"toy" or "model" economy meant to capture the relevant features of actual ones 
for the purpose of analyzing the effects of flexible monetary policies or monetary 
policies with “judgm ent calls” of the sort employed in the US and favored by 
Krugman. Playing with this "toy economy" will enable us to understand why such 
policies might lead to moderate inflation in countries like the US, but to high infla­
tion and out-of-control devaluations in countries like Argentina.
Concretely, this section will present some heuristic arguments, more formally 
developed elsewhere (Zarazaga, 1995; 1999), with the purpose of taking some 
steps to answer a variant of the question inspired by Krugman’s comment: “Why 
is it that Chairman Greenspan could not run in Argentina a flexible monetary 
policy as successfully as he has in the US?”
Because the simplified economy focuses on what appears to be the critical 
elements to provide an answer to that question, it will downplay or ignore many
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real world details that in principle are less important to understand the main fo r­
ces behind the effects of alternative monetary policy regimes.
In our toy economy, as in most of the real ones, there is the need to finance 
goods and services provided by the government, such as maintenance o f essen­
tial infrastructure (i.e. roads and highways). Typically, the amount of expenditures 
that the provision o f those goods and services requires vary unpredictably for a 
variety of reasons, ranging from technological changes, shocks to the price of 
raw materials and intermediate inputs needed in repairing and maintaining the 
infrastructure, or even bad weather. Following the advice of advocates of “flexi­
ble” monetary policies, the policymaker in charge of providing public goods and 
services in our model economy is convinced that it is a good idea to finance them 
with expansions of the money supply of between 1 percent and 3 percent. Notice 
that the resulting monetary policy is flexible in the sense that it is looser in the 
“states of the world” in which the government needs more financing due to 
shocks to its revenues or expenditures, but tighter in the “states of the world” in 
which the opposite is true.
The well-intended policymaker in charge of assuring the provision of intrinsi­
cally public goods and services in our model economy coexist, as in most actual 
ones, with much less altruistic constituencies. These constituencies are meant to 
capture the influence on monetary and fiscal policies of representatives of impor­
tant groups of the population linked together by common interests, such as 
industry or trade associations, unions, particular regions or states, and so forth. 
Indeed, powerful public or quasi-public entities, or even industrial and financial 
conglomerates from the private sector, in almost every country try to twist the 
policym aker’s arm in their favor9.
Imagine, for example, the situation at the Ministry of Energy of our model 
economy. The request for funds that the Minister receives from the oil company 
may reflect the cost of replacing hundreds of obsolete pumps and structures, but 
also particularly generous retirement plans for the oil workers or losses in reve­
nues from a cumbersome structure of subsidized prices for gasoline and other 
fuels used by different groups of customers.
Likewise, imagine the situation at the M inistry of Defense of our model econ­
omy. Part of its expenditures may originate in the need to maintain and repair 
equipment and to pay military personnel. But other part may originate in subsi­
9 For those tempted to believe that the problem is not present in advanced economies, let 
me bring up the recent imposition of steel tariffs by the US, or the significant subsidies that 
that country has always granted to its farmers.
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dies to Research and Development by private firms and contractors that have 
managed to convince government officials that their projects have potential de­
fense applications.
What is important for our purposes is that the budget of these Ministries (or 
of any government agency or publicly-owned bank or industrial holding for that 
matter) can be eventually manipulated in their favor by constituencies and vested 
interests with substantial economic and financial relationships with those agencies.
Thus, in our model economy we can envision constituency A trying to secure 
subsidies for its members through the Minister of Energy while constituency B is 
trying to do the same through the Minister of Defense. On top of the money cre­
ated to finance those subsidies covertly channeled to the private sector through 
the M inistries is the money created to finance genuine public goods and services, 
such as the maintenance of infrastructure already mentioned.
There are many other channels through which the basic mechanism de­
scribed above may operate. Perhaps the relationships between the federal and 
provincial governments, or between the central bank and commercial banks with 
access to the discount window provide an even more eloquent image of the kind 
of institutional reality that we are trying to capture in our very simple model econ­
omy. In the case of provinces, suppose that a couple of them in a given country 
succeed in passing laws exempting businesses located in their jurisdictions from 
some federal tax, for example, federal income or corporate earning taxes. The 
tax exemptions would then benefit the taxpayers of those provinces at the ex­
pense of the whole population, which will be paying now the higher inflation tax 
necessary to compensate the resulting shortfall in fiscal revenues. That is, the 
provinces act as i f  they had the ability to print money.
In the case of banks, they could successfully secure lines of credit from the 
discount w indow against collateral composed basically of unrecoverable loans 
that the central bank cannot readily identified as such. From the point of view of 
formal accounting, the expansion of the money supply is not necessarily infla­
tionary because it is backed by the commercial paper offered as collateral. But 
from a practical point of view, the market value of the collateral could be much 
lower than recognized by the central bank. If the commercial bank fails, the cen­
tral bank is left with a pile of unrecoverable loans and the bank’s shareholders 
will have received, therefore, a subsidy equal to the difference between the m ar­
ket value and the nominal value of the loans offered as collateral in discount w in­
dow operations. The whole population will end up paying for this subsidy in the 
form of a higher inflation.
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So far then we have in our model economy two basic ingredients: a flexible 
or state-contingent monetary policy and constituencies that try to manipulate it in 
their favor. Since both ingredients appear virtually in every economy (see foot­
note 9) their presence cannot possibly explain why flexible monetary policies will 
produce quite reasonable outcomes in some countries, and create havoc in oth­
ers. The critical ingredient that can potentially make a difference must be some­
thing else and is suggested by the answer to a question that, although trivial in 
appearance, has far-reaching implications: Can constituencies A and B deter­
mine exactly which part of government spending went to finance, say, mainte­
nance of infrastructure, and which part went to finance subsidies or goods and 
services enjoyed only by the other constituency or province7 Can bank A tell that 
a central bank discount window advance to its competitor B was just bridging a 
genuine short-term  liquidity need and not covering losses from bad loans? If 
each constituency (or bank, or province) can say how the taxpayers’ money was 
used in each and every instance, our model economy is characterized by perfect 
monitoring. By contrast, if the different constituencies can't determ ine with cer­
tainty how the government revenues from all sources (including the inflation tax) 
were used, our model economy suffers from imperfect monitoring.
W hy is information about the use of the public m on ies-in  particular, of the in­
flation ta x -s o  important in our model economy? Because the availability (and 
quality) of that information will have dramatic consequences for the outcomes of 
flexible monetary policies. Under perfect monitoring, inflation will remain low and 
devaluations will be typically small.
By contrast, with imperfect monitoring, the attempt to implement a flexible 
monetary policy, which in our model economy takes the form of financing gov­
ernment goods and services with a rate of money creation that varies with the 
“state of the world,” will set the time inconsistency forces lose and unleash in­
surmountable political pressures for higher subsidies financed with money crea­
tion. As a consequence, the attempt to devalue “just a little" will end up in an out- 
of-control depreciation of the currency and higher inflation than intended.
II. 1 - The time inconsistency high inflation bias
Before attempting to explain why the structure of information makes a differ­
ence for the outcomes of a flexible monetary policy, it is important to point out 
that a high inflation bias is always present in our toy economy, even when the 
allocation of government spending among different potential uses can be per­
fectly monitored.
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To understand the source of that bias, notice that in the “toy economy” just 
described the money creation used to finance subsidies to a particular constitu­
ency imposes an inflation tax on the money holdings of the whole population 
(including those of the constituents receiving the subsidy,) even if the proceeds 
of that tax are captured only by the fraction of the population receiving the sub­
sidy (that is, only by the members of the constituency benefiting from the sub­
sidy). That means that each constituency faces a trade off in setting its desired 
level of subsidy: utility from the subsidy increases, at a decreasing rate, with the 
size of the subsidy, but higher subsidies need to be financed with higher inflation, 
which hurts all consumers, including the members of the constituency receiving 
the subsidy10. However, each constituency takes into account only the costs that 
a higher inflation imposes on its own members, and not on the members of the 
other constituencies. Accordingly, each constituency will pick a level of subsidy 
that is larger than it would have been if it had taken into account the costs of 
inflation to the whole society. This is precisely the source of the high inflation bias 
present in our “toy economy:” as each constituency behaves the same way, the 
outcome will be a higher rate of money creation and, therefore, of inflation, than 
any of them had individually intended. That higher inflation ends up offsetting the 
benefits of what were individually perceived as desirable (or “optimal” ) subsidies 
and makes all constituencies worse off.
More technically speaking, the failure of each constituency to internalize all 
the costs of inflation to society gives rise to a “political economy” game in which 
Nash equilibria are not Pareto Optimal (see Zarazaga, 1999).
Readers familiar with the literature may argue that the inefficiently high infla­
tion bias just described is the result of a “free rider” problem and not of the time 
inconsistency that we have been claiming all along. However, that perception is 
created because for purposes of exposition, we have focused the attention on the 
failure of each constituency to internalize the costs that inflation imposes on other 
constituencies. But the time inconsistency problem is still present, albeit in a more 
subtle way, on the side of the benefits, rather than the costs, of the subsidy.
To see that, suppose that each and every constituency promised to contrib­
ute to an overall low inflation by not pressing for any subsidies. The prospect of a 
low inflation will induce a high demand for money balances, which are the natural 
base of the inflation tax. Now the informed readers will recognize the time incon­
sistency temptation faced by the constituencies of our toy economy: to promise 
first to keep subsidies, and therefore, inflation, low, and later renege on that pro­
mise to exploit the opportunity to extract additional revenues (subsidies) by
10 For the details, see Zarazaga (1995).
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taxing more heavily (with inflation) the higher level of real money balances accu­
mulated under that promise.
To sum up, the high inflation bias in our toy economy comes from two 
sources: the time inconsistency problem on the side of the benefits from the sub­
sidy, and the “free rider” problem on the side of the costs of the subsidy, repre­
sented by the inflation tax required to finance it.
Is there any way to resolve this high inflation bias or, what is the same, of 
inducing the representatives of each interest group not to press for subsidies 
that appear to benefit his constituency but whose effect is just to cause higher 
inflation?
The answer is a resounding yes for our model economy under perfect moni­
toring, but not under imperfect monitoring. Put differently, in an economy charac­
terized by perfect monitoring in the allocation of government spending it is 
possible to keep the high inflation bias in latent state. But that bias will manifest 
itself in full force in an economy where imperfect monitoring of government spen­
ding prevails instead.
11.1.1 - Inflation under control when the constituencies know 
where the money went
The perfect monitoring scenario is ideal for understanding why flexible m one­
tary policies, despite the presence of the high inflation bias mentioned earlier, 
don't lead to out-of-control devaluations in the presence of political and fiscal 
institutions that make it possible to perfectly monitor how the government actually 
spends the money in its potentially numerous areas of influence (remember that 
even the central bank discount window can be used to funnel subsidies to com ­
mercial banks!).
The way to keep the high inflation bias in latent state in this perfect m onitor­
ing environment is by exploiting the fact that each constituency can perfectly 
observe the actions taken by the others. This feature will invite the constituencies 
almost naturally to reach the implicit arrangement of not granting subsidies to 
their members in the understanding that a deviation by one constituency will trig­
ger a sim ilar deviation by the others, leading to a "war of subsidies" whose fi­
nancing will require substantial expansions of the money supply. The resulting 
inflation will be so high that it will end up hurting everyone, including the constitu­
ency that cheated in the first place. The threat of this "high inflation punishment" 
(and the associated pronounced devaluation of the currency) deters each con­
stituency from falling into the time inconsistency trap and pressing for more sub­
24 Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura
sidies than implicitly “agreed.” By virtue of this temptation-deterring mechanism, 
inflation is kept low all the time. The key to this result is that deviations by any 
constituency from any given low subsidy policy (strategy,) will be detected with 
probability one in this perfect information environment.
More technically speaking, in perfect monitoring environments, trigger strate­
gies of the type discussed in Barro and Gordon (1983) can enforce cooperative 
outcomes in which the inflation rate and the money supply growth driving it re­
main permanently low.
Indeed, a flexible monetary policy will run as smoothly as its advocates would 
have predicted in the perfect monitoring environment of our “toy econom y:” the 
money supply will grow just the amount necessary to finance genuine govern­
ment spending, at annual rates of between 1% and 3 %. As a consequence, 
inflation will remain within that moderate range.
The situation changes dramatically, however, if deviations by any constitu­
ency from a “ low subsidy” policy cannot be detected w ithout ambiguity.
11.1.2 - Inflation when the constituencies don't know where the money went
■ The high inflation bias always present in our toy economy cannot be kept in 
latent state, however, under conditions of imperfect monitoring, that is, when it is 
no longer possible to detect with probability one whether a constituency has 
cheated (received higher subsidies than implicitly agreed) every time the money 
supply grows at an abnormally high rate.
In particular, assume for a moment that it is no longer possible in our toy 
economy to distinguish between increases in the money supply originated in the 
need to finance a higher level of genuine government expenditures (such as 
maintenance of roads and schools) from those increases originated in the "self­
ish" actions of the constituencies that successfully pressed for more subsidies. 
This uncertainty reproduces the imperfect monitoring conditions of the repeated 
games developed in the industrial organization literature by Porter (1983), Green 
and Porter (1984), and Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1986, 1990) and suggests 
therefore our main conjecture: that recurrent high inflations and out-of-control 
devaluations play the same role as the "price wars" in models of oligopolistic 
competition with imperfect information.
The problem is that in imperfect information environments, the same flexible 
monetary policy that so satisfactory results produced under perfect information 
turns out to "muddy the waters," in the sense that it makes impossible to estab­
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lish with certainty whether or not some constituency has obtained higher subsi­
dies than it was supposed to.
To make the point clearer, suppose that there are two constituencies, each of 
which has "agreed" to restrict to 2% per period the rate of money creation that 
finances subsidies to its members. On top of the resulting 4% "constituency- 
induced" expansion of the money supply, assume that the "judgment calls" of the 
well-intended policymaker can lead to additional money supply growth anywhere 
between 1% and 3% per period, as it was the case under the flexible monetary 
policy implemented in the perfect monitoring case.
Suppose now that in some periods the overall money supply expands at the 
unusually high rate of 6.5%. This may have happened in an infinite number of 
ways, but the following two will suffice to illustrate the point: 1) each constituency 
induced a 2% expansion of the money supply, to finance subsidies as agreed, 
and the well-intended policymaker expanded it by an additional 2.5% to finance 
“genuine” government spending, or 2) the well-intended policymaker increased 
the money supply by 1%, one of the constituencies kept its promise of inducing 
only a 2% money supply growth, but the other one cheated and induced a 3.5% 
expansion of the money supply, in order to enjoy subsidies above and beyond 
those financed with the agreed 2% “constituency-induced” expansion of the mo­
ney supply.
With perfect monitoring, all constituencies will be able to distinguish the first 
case from the second. The reason is that they can exactly identify the sources of 
expansion of the money supply. However, if that ability is missing, all they know 
is that the money supply has expanded at a rate of 6.5%. They cannot tell 
whether that outcome was the result of some constituency cheating and getting 
more subsidies (Case No. 2) or simply of the well-intended policymaker expand­
ing the money supply at the rate of 2.5% (Case No. 1). This means that the con­
stituencies lost the ability they had in the perfect monitoring environment to 
detect unwarranted subsidies with absolute certainty. This poses a problem: 
should they punish unusually high expansions of the money supply, such as the 
6.5% of the example? If they do not, sooner or later some constituency will real­
ize that now it can obtain more subsidies w ithout fearing that the resulting higher 
increase of the money supply will trigger damaging retaliatory "subsidy w ars.” On 
the other hand, if they retaliate with a "subsidy war", they might be punishing 
deviations that never occurred: after all, the 6.5% increase in the money supply 
may have been caused, as in case 1, by the well intended “judgm ent calls" of the 
benevolent policymaker and not by a "greedy" constituency attempting to grab 
more than its “fair share” of subsidies.
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As intuition may suggest, and as demonstrated by Zarazaga (1999) in an ap­
plication of the basic result in the paper from Green and Porter already men­
tioned, the solution to this problem is a compromise between the two extreme 
strategies: sometimes the constituencies will not react, on the assumption that no 
one cheated; and sometimes they will retaliate, on the suspicion that some con­
stituency cheated and got more than its "fair" share of subsidies. In particular, in 
imperfect information environments, retaliations will occur when the rate of 
growth of the money supply exceeds certain threshold. For instance, take the 
6.5% of the numerical example as the threshold. Each constituency will assume 
that none of the others has cheated while it sees the money supply growing be­
low or at 6.5%. But when the money supply expands beyond that, they will retali­
ate with "subsidy wars" for some time. During this punishment phase, inflation 
soars and can account for the recurrent high inflations and out-of-control de­
valuations observed in countries like Argentina.
Notice that, in contrast with the imperfect information case, the punishment is 
effectively implemented even if no constituency cheats. The mechanism just 
described may appear perverse at first sight: why trigger "subsidy wars" if no one 
has deviated from the prescribed path of subsidies? Because if the punishment 
would not take place, then the constituencies will start cheating! That is, the 
"subsidy wars" do not punish cheating: they prevent it11.
11.2 - A baseball analogy
Luckily, baseball is fairly popular in Venezuela and therefore an analogy with 
a common situation faced by the players in that sport will help the reader to un­
derstand the intricacies (and everyday relevance!) of the mechanism to deal with 
potential cheating described above. The ability to draw such analogy should not 
be surprising, as baseball is precisely a game played under imperfect monitoring 
conditions.
Recall the "old ball game” rule that the batter is awarded a run to first base 
when hit by a "bean ball" thrown by the pitcher. What's the rationale for such a 
rule? After all, it’s not easy even for well-intended pitchers to keep under perfect 
control a ball they are throwing at a speed of about 90 miles per hour. It seems 
too harsh to penalize a pitcher for what may have been an accident. The problem 
is that the umpire cannot tell. All he sees is the ball hitting the batter, not the pit­
cher's intentions, very much as the constituents in the imperfect monitoring
11 For a more in-depth account of the subtleties of this self-enforcing, Pareto constrained 
mechanism, see the papers by Porter and Green and Porter already mentioned.
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scenario of the example above see only the rate of expansion of the money sup­
ply, not what brought it about.
Note that the baseball umpire faces a quandary similar to the one the con­
stituencies face when they observe a suspiciously high rate of expansion of the 
money supply (that the batter is hit, in our analogy): Was the batter hit by accident 
or on purpose? A good-hearted umpire leaning to the first interpretation would be 
tempted to suspend the run of the batter to first base on the grounds that it's unfair 
and unnecessary to.punish the pitcher for an accident. But note that this benevo­
lent and naive attitude will give pitchers incentives to start doing the opposite, that 
is, to start hitting batters (and forced them out of the game) on purpose, anticipat­
ing that the gullible umpire will think the batter was hurt by accident and, therefore, 
that he will not award a run to first base to the batter. It should be clear why the 
rule must be implemented, even if the batter was hit by accident: it forces the 
pitchers to be careful. Batters will still be eventually hit from time to time by acci­
dent, but at least much less often than they would without the rule.
Likewise, in our model each constituency is careful not to ask for excessive 
subsidies, because it knows that doing so can push the increase in the money 
supply more often beyond the threshold that triggers the undesirable "subsidy 
wars." It is true that occasionally the well-intended policymaker will increase the 
money supply above the threshold and that this will trigger those wars anyway. 
But what the mechanism described does, both in baseball and in our model, is to 
give the players incentives to reduce the frequency of undesired outcomes. And 
a situation similar to the one in baseball would arise in our model if the punish­
ment (retaliatory subsidies) were not implemented on the ground that the money 
supply grew beyond a certain threshold as a result of a "judgment call" by the 
well-intended policymaker and not because some self-serving constituency ob­
tained higher than agreed subsidies. In imperfect information environments, there 
is no way to avoid such "undeserved" punishments. Putting the punishment on 
hold would ignore that it is precisely its effective implementation what deters con­
stituencies from requesting higher subsidies all the time and, therefore, from 
pushing the economy into a permanent state of extremely high inflation.
11.3- Insights from the toy economy
11.3.1 - The advantages of non-contingent policy rules
By now the readers may have started to figure out the advantages of iron­
clad, non-contingent rules in our toy economy in imperfect monitoring situations. 
A currency board, for example, completely eliminates all ambiguity regarding the
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evolution of the money supply: it expands or contracts with and only with corre­
sponding expansions and contractions of the international reserves. The attempt 
by any constituency to get away with subsidies financed with money creation will 
be immediately detected, because the resulting expansion of the money supply 
would not have a counterpart in a corresponding increase in the international 
reserves.
In other words, a currency board, dollarization, and in general any ironclad, 
non-contingent monetary policy rule restores perfect monitoring conditions in 
economic environments in which those conditions would otherwise be lacking. 
This makes it possible to enforce a “zero subsidy” and therefore, a very low infla­
tion outcome with the same “trigger strategy” mechanism described for the per­
fect information toy econom y12.
II.3.2 - The perils of flexible rules
By the same token, the readers may have started to perceive the perils of re­
placing non-contingent rules with more “flexible” ones when imperfect monitoring 
conditions prevail. To reiterate, flexible monetary policies in those environments 
will not remove the ambiguity about the sources of expansion of the money sup­
ply intrinsic to those environments. The suspicion that money growth is prompted 
by. attempts from some constituencies to benefit from the inflation tax at the ex­
pense of others will make it impossible to resist the assault of the always present 
time inconsistent high inflation bias and as result, flexible policies will likely end 
up in higher inflation and devaluations than intended.
It is based on these insights from the toy economy that I warned already in 
1997 that in the case of Argentina.
“replacing the currency board arrangement with more discretionary policies will 
be a dangerous move, at least until transparency in the allocation of public spending 
is achieved. Perhaps the ability to tell first "where the public monies went" should be 
the focus of attention of those trying to find ways to get off the back of the "currency 
board tiger" without the risk of being eaten up by furious inflationary forces.” (Zara- 
zaga, 1997, p. 66).
12 More rigorously speaking, by virtue of its “transparency equivalence” feature in envi­
ronments otherwise characterized by imperfect monitoring, non-contingent monetary pol­
icy rules may eventually reintroduce in the feasible equilibrium set Pareto efficient 
outcomes that can be supported as sub-game perfect equilibria under reputational strate­
gies. See Zarazaga (1999).
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The evidence briefly reviewed in the Appendix suggests that these predic­
tions turned out to be, unfortunately, closer to the facts than the rosy picture of a 
quick recovery envisioned by those who confidently advocated a devaluation for 
Argentina.
Abandoning the currency board seems to have been, indeed, a bad idea, ex­
actly as the “right-wing" think tanks reviled by Krugman had been telling all along. 
But I’m confident that it will not be easy to trace “ right w ing” influence in the ar­
guments presented in these comments. Paradoxically, it has been by abandon­
ing the “perfect information” assumption typically prevalent in “right wing thinking” 
that currency boards come out ahead of more flexible monetary regimes in our 
toy economy. In fact, I invite anyone tempted to think otherwise to read Joseph 
Stiglitz’s Nobel Laureate lecture (2002.) My toy economy has played the game by 
the rules he suggested there. Since no one would dare to accuse Stiglitz of right 
wing thinking, it will be much more difficult from now on to dismiss concerns 
about abandoning currency boards as “old-time economic religion , with its nar­
row-m inded insistence on m onetary rectitude at the expense o f every other con­
sideration".
In fact, our toy economy, played with the rules of the game suggested “by the 
left,” suggests that it is equally dangerous to extol the virtues of “discretionary 
policies at the expense of every other consideration.” Devaluation doctors may 
now be looking for all kind of excuses to explain why their predictions failed so 
m iserably in Argentina. But we know now from the insights of our toy economy 
that they forgot to check whether the societies for which they prescribed their 
supposedly more “state-of-the-arts” policies could monitor the actions of those in 
charge of implementing them.
Somewhat paradoxically, the efforts required to follow the tedious technical 
arguments in this section will have been justified if after going through them the 
readers end up dismissing the malpractice charges imaginary raised against 
those who advocated a devaluation for Argentina. After all, according to the ten­
tative interpretation offered in these comments, the flexible monetary policy pre­
scription was not obviously misguided and in fact, it might have worked alright, 
had not it been for the presence of anomalies in Argentina’s econom ic body that 
the profession as whole has failed so far to recognize. Placated by the under­
standing of why devaluation doctors home and abroad erred so m iserably, the 
angry Argentines might be more willing to consider out-of-court settlement offers 
from the defense. That would certainly be a welcomed development for so many 
doctors facing the prospect of serving jail time if the case went to trial and the 
jury found them guilty as charged of the misery and starvation of thousands of 
Argentine children. They will surely perform the necessary extra tests next time
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around, lest they want to kill the patient and face malpractice charges once more, 
but then without the alibi that the profession as a whole didn’t know any better.
Ill - TOYS AND REALITY
As many doctors had ordered, Argentina devalued, and the cure turned out 
to be worse than the alleged disease.
In these comments we have tried to rationalize why the doctors prescribed so 
confidently the devaluation medicine. They were just applying the well- 
established result that state-contingent, that is, “flexible” monetary policy rules 
are superior, in terms of welfare, to non-state contingent, that is, “ rigid” ones. 
Since the currency board that Argentina had implemented since 1991 was in­
deed such a rigid rule, the advice to get rid of it seemed to be grounded on seri­
ous scientific thinking.
However, the recommendation forgot to read the fine print in the label of the 
devaluation drug: “Warning: doses are state-contingent. Use only if patient can 
perfectly tell apart each and every contingency from the other."
We have heuristically presented a model economy that has demonstrated 
the. paramount importance of that caveat for the effects of monetary policy. As in 
actual economies, the time inconsistency of optimal state-contingent (or “flexible) 
plans introduces a high inflation bias in that model economy. As in actual 
economies, the presence of interest groups that want to exploit that time incon­
sistency problem in their favor exacerbates that bias. Flexible monetary policies 
can be successfully implemented without unleashing the high inflation bias only 
under conditions of perfect transparency regarding the actions of the monetary 
authority.
We have shown what happens in our toy economy when that transparency is 
lost: the inability of different constituencies to tell apart one “state of the world” 
from the other, and in particular, whether or not every constituency has “be­
haved” as agreed, activates the time inconsistency problem that was dormant in 
the perfect monitoring case. As a result, the very same flexible monetary policy 
that may have been successful in the perfect information environment ends up in 
high inflation and out-of-control devaluations.
We have argued that perfect monitoring conditions were far from being a re­
ality in Argentina and that therefore the replacement of a “rigid” currency board 
with “flexible" monetary policies was more likely to have the dreadful effects sug­
gested by our toy economy than the balsamic ones predicted by those who con­
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fidently recommended the drug to ailing Argentina. Indeed, the predictions that 
we made in 1997 based on the insights from that economy seem to have largely 
materialized after Argentina abandoned the very transparent currency board 
arrangement that had been in place since 1991.
It is not the desire to brag about superior forecasting skills that compel me to 
bring up once more the observation that “we had told you so” five years ago re­
garding the disastrous consequences of a devaluation in Argentina. Rather, it is 
the scientific need to validate the relevance of a working hypothesis for making 
statements about the real world. To the extent that the predictions from the mo­
del economy seem to have been closer to the mark than predictions based on 
other models, I can now proceed with some confidence to apply the insights ob­
tained with our toy economy to make conjectures about the likely fate and chan­
ces of ultimate success of the main monetary policy options open to Latin 
America in the 21st century.
IV - CONCLUSION
Throughout these comments the maintained hypothesis has been that the 
reason why the economies of many Latin American countries like Argentina o 
Venezuela are mired in stagnation is because those countries seem to be prone 
to fall into the same time inconsistency temptation that more developed countries 
appear to resist.
We have argued that the reason why some countries may not be able to re­
sist the time inconsistency temptation more than others is because they lack the 
ability to perfectly monitor the actions of the monetary and fiscal authorities. 
W ithout that necessary transparency, “state contingent” (flexible) monetary poli­
cies cannot resist, as they do in economies with perfect information, the assault 
of different constituencies that exacerbate the time inconsistency high inflation 
bias. As a result, the very same policies that might be optimal in economies 
characterized by perfect information create havoc in the form of high inflation and 
seemingly out-of-control devaluations.
If the choice of a monetary policy for Latin America were left to those who re­
commended a devaluation for Argentina, they would surely like to see all Latin 
American countries implementing a “flexible” monetary policy resembling the one 
that Germany seems to have followed between 1980 and 2000, as described in 
section I. That would seem a priori a sound decision, since it is well known that
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optimal monetary policies have the feature of being “state contingent” or, more 
loosely speaking, “flexible” 13.
However, that recommendation would overlook that most Latin American 
countries are plagued with the same kind of informational problems present in 
our model economy. In that context, rigid, non-state contingent monetary policies 
such as currency boards might do better because, unlike flexible ones, they do 
not “muddy the waters” even more in an environment in which the lack of trans­
parency is already dismal.
An obvious policy recommendation would be to fix the informational problem, 
instead of doing away with the flexible policies that eventually exacerbate it. But 
this sensible course of action raises a host of questions: Which are exactly the 
sources of the informational problems that prevent the monitoring of the actions 
of the fiscal and monetary authorities? Is there any way to quantify the severity of 
the problem? If so, what would be the best way to alleviate it or elim inate it?
These are all questions that do not have yet answers, in part because the 
importance of finding them has not been fully appreciated. Perhaps this is an­
other case of “theory ahead of measurement” and future research will make pro­
gress on that front.
. Existing work, however, suggests that transparency is closely associated 
with the development of adequate institutions. A study by Alesina, Hausrriann, 
Hommes, and Stein (1996) finds that the Latin American countries with the best 
budgetary institutions in terms of a transparency index have also the lowest infla­
tion rates. But there is still a lot of work to be done in this relatively unexplored 
area of research before we can better understand the subtle and surely complex 
links between institutions and the ability to monitor the implementation of mone­
tary and fiscal policies. And even if it were possible to acquire all the necessary 
knowledge overnight, institutions take many years, perhaps generations, to 
change.
No doubt that in the long run Latin America should aim at creating the condi­
tions for implementing state contingent or “flexible” monetary policies. But follow­
ing the old Keynesian wisdom that “ in the long run we are all dead,” a relevant 
question is then what is the best monetary policy during the long transition time 
that the necessary institutional overhaul will eventually take.
13 In fact, Bordo and Kydland (1995) have argued that even the gold standard could be 
interpreted as a rule with state-contingent escape clauses.
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The toy economy with which we have “played” in these comments suggests 
that insisting with “state contingent" monetary policies simply because they are 
optimal under perfect information may be counterproductive. For the reasons we 
discussed, in the muddy informational conditions prevailing in Latin America tho­
se “flexible” policies may lead to periodic financial crises and out-of-control deva­
luations, unavoidably associated with social unrest. That is hardly the best 
climate to implement deep institutional reforms. As a result, flexible policies may 
end up delaying, if not derailing altogether, the reform process meant to create 
the conditions under which those policies would stop causing trouble and start 
working properly, as they are supposed to in perfect information environments.
As demonstrated in our model economy, non-contingent rules such as cur­
rency boards and dollarization may, by its very nature, restore transparency in 
environments otherwise lacking of it and, therefore, reintroduce the possibility of 
articulating strategies that help societies and governments to resist the time in­
consistency temptation. Since informational problems in monitoring the activities 
of the public sector and the policymaking process seem to be common in Latin 
America, non-contingent monetary regimes such as a currency board or outright 
dollarization might be the best policy option left to the countries in that region that 
have gone from one devaluation and financial crisis to the next. Advocates of 
currency boards and dollarization may see in this policy recommendation a vindi­
cation of their sympathy for those regimes. However, they are not exempt of rea­
ding the fine print in the instructions o f the medication either: “Discontinue use 
after completing treatment for your imperfect information disease” .
To offer one last analogy, the situation is similar to the one a dentist faces 
during a root canal procedure. He well knows that patients dislike the idea of 
having to keep their mouth wide open and dry while he performs the procedure. 
The patients will tolerate the odd situation as long as they see the dentist frantic­
ally and competently working to rid them of their pain. But they might lose their 
temper and even react violently if the dentist disappeared for hours and his assis­
tant attempted to force them to keep the uncomfortable position in the meantime.
Likewise, it may be that dollarization and currency boards are the only stop­
gap devices that many Latin American countries have left to keep the time incon­
sistency high inflation bias under control while, and this is crucial, they engage in 
a coordinated effort to implement the institutional reforms to bring the necessary 
transparency to the policymaking process. Once that condition is met, those 
same countries should consider switching to flexible monetary policies in princi­
ple optimal in perfect information contexts.
In that understanding, countries that dollarize should not do so on the false 
perception that such policy will allow them to readily “ import” the institutional fra-
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fram ework behind the almighty US dollar and relieve them, therefore, from the 
hard work o f setting up their own transparency-inducing institutions. Even the 
stoic citizens of Latin America will not endure an open and dry mouth forever. 
Dollarization and currency boards should be useful stepping-stones, not the end 
of the road, in the process of creating the conditions for the successful implem en­
tation of welfare enhancing, state-contingent policies.
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EXHIBIT A
Argentina: GDP per capita 
The lost decades
EXHIBIT B
Argentina: Exchange rate fixed, yet... 
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Uruguay: Exchange rate "flexible" yet... 
growth performance not better than Argentina's
"Normal" Countries Don't Devalue All The Time: 
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we briefly examine the evidence for Argentina after it aban­
doned its currency board. To that effect, it would be misleading to take January 
6, 2002, the date in which that system was abandoned de jure, as the date in 
which it was abandoned in practice. That had happened de facto  much earlier, in 
April 25, 2001, when then Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo, in strange 
complicity with a left wing legislator, Elisa Carrió, sacked Pedro Pou, the presi­
dent of the Central Bank, after he refused to lend to the government, as ex­
pressly prohibited by the Convertibilily Law.
Having terminated with the independence of the Central Bank, Cavallo was 
able to complete his plan. The new central bank authorities proceeded to happily 
accept government bonds at face value as collateral for an equivalent amount of 
international reserves, which the Treasury “borrowed just for a little while” to 
honor sovereign debt obligations that were coming due.
As later developments proved the government bonds offered as collateral 
worthless, the swap just described left the money base unbacked well below the 
lower limit established by the Convertibility Law. As if mimicking a Greek tragedy, 
that Law had been sacrificed at the hands of its own father.
Cavallo took two other crucial steps that directly contributed to the collapse of 
the currency board way before its official demise on January 6, 2002. In April he 
submitted to Congress legislation that proposed to abandon the Convertibility 
Law (to “expand” it, in terms of an administration that repeatedly proved its fond­
ness for euphemisms) and replace it with a system in which each unit of the local 
currency would no longer be backed exactly by one US dollar, but by a basket of 
currencies, composed in equal parts by the dollar and the newly launched euro.
Notice that this proposal was indeed a move in the direction of the more 
“flexible” monetary policies demanded by the experts who were urging the Argen­
tina to relax the straitjacket with which the Convertibility Law was, according to 
them, “choking” its economy. Entirely in line with the predictions from our toy 
economy, this turned out to be a very unfortunate decision.
To top it all, in October 2002 Cavallo authorized the Treasury to issue a non­
interest bearing bond, the LECOP (Letras de Cancelación de Obligaciones Pro­
vinciales,) to cancel federal government obligations with the provinces. Since the 
private sector could use these bonds to pay federal taxes, for all practical 
purposes they became currency issued by the Treasury that circulated in parallel 
and at par with the currency issued by the central bank.
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Later on, the government allowed the province of Buenos Aires to issue a 
sim ilar bond, the Patacón, which could also be used to cancel federal taxes. Ot­
her provinces followed suit, as the ability of each to print its own currency set in 
motion the “free rider inflation tax-cum-time-inconsistency” mechanism described 
in our toy economy. As of the time of this writing, the stock of circulating quasicu­
rrencies is equivalent to about 80% of the stock of money base. That is, in 
practice the provinces almost doubled the money base. The inflationary pres­
sures generated by that proliferation of quasi-currencies remained uncertain as 
of the time of this writing, in part because the quasicurrencies issued by smaller 
provinces traded at considerable discounts and in part because the government 
simultaneously introduced severe capital controls and froze some prices, particu­
larly of transportation and utilities.
The dismissal of a “rigid” central banker, the relaxation of the monetary policy 
regime he was trying to enforce according to the law, the looser monetary policy 
implemented with quasicurrencies, were all manifestations of the attempt to im­
plement the more flexible monetary policies that supposedly would take Argen­
tina out o f its economic slump. The results were indeed disappointing.
The attempt to devalue “jus t a little” (30%, from $1 per US dollar on January 
5, 2002, to $1.4 on January 6) ended up, as our model economy would have 
predicted, in a devaluation more than twice as high (70% as of the time of this 
writing, when a US dollar sold for $3.5.) Consumer prices, which had declined
1.1 % in 2001, were bound to increase by about 40% in 2002 against the back­
ground of a GDP falling at a 10-12% annual rate. Simultaneously, consistent with 
the outcomes of flexible policies in imperfect information environments captured 
in our model economy, Argentina witnessed an avalanche of subsidies to all sort 
o f debtors, consumers of public utilities, and provinces desperately trying to grab 
a larger share of the inflation tax by printing their own currencies. Nothing farther 
from the virtuous circle of growth and prosperity that the devaluation was sup­
posed to bring about.
